Michigan Technological University

Digital Commons @ Michigan Tech
Dissertations, Master's Theses and Master's
Reports - Open

Dissertations, Master's Theses and Master's
Reports

2013

CONVERSION OF DOMAIN TYPE ENFORCEMENT LANGUAGE TO
THE JAVA SECURITY MANAGER
JAMES WALKER
Michigan Technological University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/etds
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Copyright 2013 JAMES WALKER
Recommended Citation
WALKER, JAMES, "CONVERSION OF DOMAIN TYPE ENFORCEMENT LANGUAGE TO THE JAVA SECURITY
MANAGER", Master's report, Michigan Technological University, 2013.
https://doi.org/10.37099/mtu.dc.etds/599

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/etds
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

CONVERSION OF DOMAIN TYPE ENFORCEMENT LANGUAGE TO THE JAVA
SECURITY MANAGER

By
James Walker

A REPORT
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
In Computer Science

MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
2013

© 2013 James Walker

This report has been approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE in Computer Science.

Department of Computer Science

Report Advisor:

Steven Carr

Report Co-Advisor:

Jean Mayo

Committee Member:

Xinli Wang

Department Chair:

Charles Wallace

Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction........................................................................................................5
Chapter 2. Related Work....................................................................................................10
Chapter 3. The DTEL to JSM Compiler............................................................................12
Chapter 4. Tests and Performance Analysis......................................................................21
Chapter 5. Conclusion........................................................................................................32

3

Abstract
With today's prevalence of Internet-connected systems storing sensitive data and the
omnipresent threat of technically skilled malicious users, computer security remains a
critically important field. Because of today's multitude of vulnerable systems and security
threats, it is vital that computer science students be taught techniques for programming
secure systems, especially since many of them will work on systems with sensitive data
after graduation. Teaching computer science students proper design, implementation, and
maintenance of secure systems is a challenging task that calls for the use of novel
pedagogical tools. This report describes the implementation of a compiler that converts
mandatory access control specification Domain-Type Enforcement Language to the Java
Security Manager, primarily for pedagogical purposes. The implementation of the Java
Security Manager was explored in depth, and various techniques to work around its
inherent limitations were explored and partially implemented, although some of these
workarounds do not appear in the current version of the compiler because they would
have compromised cross-platform compatibility. The current version of the compiler and
implementation details of the Java Security Manager are discussed in depth.
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Chapter 1.
1.1.

Introduction

Background

Designing and enforcing information security policies is a significant challenge. Today,
system designers and administrators face a combination of ubiquitous Internet
connections, heavy dependence on functional computing infrastructures, storage of
massive amounts of sensitive data, and myriad technically skilled malicious agents. In
this environment, maintaining a secure system is crucial.
Many tools and techniques have been developed to address this challenge. Among these
tools are discretionary access controls and mandatory access controls. Discretionary
access controls restrict access to entities based on the identity of subjects, such as users
and processes, to which they belong. The owner can typically transfer permissions to
other subjects as well, hence the term discretionary. An example of a discretionary access
control is the familiar Unix permission system. In this system, every file defines read,
write, and execute permissions for that file's owner, group, and everyone else. Typically,
the owner of the file can change these permissions at will. For instance, the owner may
grant himself the ability to read and write to a file, give his group read-only access, and
not allow users outside the group to access the file at all.
In mandatory access control, the operating system or similar entity constrains access
based on a set of rules. In this paradigm, subjects may not transfer access rights if they
are restricted from doing so. In other words, it is the system (and the person responsible
for maintaining the system), not end users, that controls file system and execution
permissions. As an example, the system may divide users into various classes and restrict
5

users based on class from accessing the files in a given directory and its subdirectories. In
this case, if users did not belong to the appropriate class, there is nothing they could do to
access the restricted directory, nor could anyone grant them this permission except by
changing the system's security configuration, or by moving them to another class (an
action which itself would probably be restricted by the security configuration). The
ability to configure universal security restrictions in this manner is a powerful tool.
One such mandatory access control is Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) [1]. The two
most important concepts in DTE are domains and types. Domains define a security
context in which processes operate, while types categorize paths in the file system's
directory structure. Access modes, which include reading, writing, executing, and
creating files, are restricted from domains to types and also between domains. Badger et
al [2] have presented a formal definition for specifying DTE policies known as Domain
Type Enforcement Language (DTEL). DTEL allows for the creation of more compact
and maintainable security policies than standard type enforcement, which requires the
development and maintenance of potentially enormous access control tables [3]. A DTEL
policy file concisely describes all of the domains, types, and the access modes that are
permitted between them on a given system.
Security is vital not only at the operating system level, but also at the application level.
Safe programming languages include facilities for writing secure code. The Java
programming language, in particular, is known for having robust security features. One
such feature is the Java Security Manager (JSM). Java applications subject to a JSM
check with the JSM when performing certain actions, such as file system access, and
those actions are then permitted or denied based on the JSM's internal logic. A custom
security policy can be implemented by overriding the SecurityManager class and its
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relevant methods, then invoking the SecurityManager in the application to be restricted.
The SecurityManager is implemented by overriding certain methods which are called
whenever a particular action is performed; for example, checkRead and checkWrite [5]
[14].
A fundamental similarity exists between DTEL and JSM. Both define security policies
that restrict certain kinds of actions – especially file system access – based on explicitly
defined criteria. However, they have many differences as well. DTEL's security
configuration operates at the operating system level, while JSM operates at the level of an
individual application. A system under the purview of a DTEL specification is subject to
those restrictions whether it wants to be or not, whereas a Java application must willingly
invoke a JSM class to be subject to its restrictions. Furthermore, DTEL security criteria
are tightly defined and limited, while a JSM class can determine security restrictions
based on any criteria that can be programmatically implemented in its internal logic. In
this respect, JSM is more flexible in its ability to define security policies. However,
certain limitations in JSM's implementation place considerable restrictions on its ability
to implement certain kinds of security checks.

1.2.

Motivation

As the design and implementation of good security policies is difficult, so too is teaching
students how to understand computer security. To address this challenge, many
pedagogical tools have been developed. Specifically as relates to this project, Carr and
Mayo [4] have described using DTE to teach students the fundamentals of access control.
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The Domain Type Enforcement Language to Java Security Manager Compiler (D2JC) is
intended to expand the pedagogical potential of DTE as a learning tool. By using D2JC,
students will gain a multifaceted understanding of DTE, the Java Security Manager, and
access control in general. D2JC accepts only valid DTE specifications and includes
thorough semantic checks, so in order to use the compiler, students must be able to
produce well-formed DTE specifications and will be alerted to any semantic errors in
their security policies. D2JC outputs Java code specifying a custom SecurityManager
class, so in order to use the security policy within the context of a Java application,
students must understand how to assign a custom security manager to their application.
Finally, by seeing how the security manager interacts with their file system accesses, they
will observe how JSM functions and can also test and explore the implementation of their
security policy.
Together, it is hoped that these features will provide instructors with a useful tool for
teaching the idiosyncrasies of access control, DTE, and JSM to their students.

1.3.

Outcome

The current version of D2JC includes a robust parser that is capable of detecting and
reporting a wide range of both syntactic and semantic errors in DTEL specifications.
Simply by compiling their DTEL specifications, students will learn not only how to
create well-formed DTEL syntax, but also the kinds of logical mistakes that might appear
in their policies and how to avoid them. If compilation is successful, D2JC outputs code
for a valid JSM class that maps certain restrictions (primarily simple file access controls)
in the DTEL specification into JSM equivalents. This code can then be compiled and the
resulting JSM class can be invoked by Java applications to implement the security
8

restrictions. This process will teach students about Java compilation, how to invoke the
Java Security Manager, and provide the ability to test a subset of DTEL specifications
written by the students (or provided to them by instructors).
Additionally, implementation details of the Java Security Manager itself were explored in
detail. Some surprising limitations (discussed in detail in subsection 3.2.3) were
discovered in the JSM's implementation that prevented a full mapping of DTEL to JSM
restrictions. To summarize, it was discovered that the JSM's ability to check the
execution of system commands is impaired; the Java FileDescriptor class does not
contain enough information to check path-based file system accesses without complex
workarounds; and the JSM is subject to its own security restrictions which can throw it
into an infinite loop. The opportunity was taken to research potential solutions to these
issues. Some of these solutions were partially implemented, but they are not included in
the final product because they would hamper cross-platform compatibility. Despite these
limitations, D2JC still has considerable value as a pedagogical tool.
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Chapter 2.
2.1.

Related Work

Domain Type Enforcement

The flexibility of DTE has attracted a significant amount of attention in research. Badger
et al [2][1] formulated DTEL as an expression of DTE policies and have explored
potential applications. Tidswell and Potter [15] proposed a dynamically configurable
variant of DTE. Hallyn and Kearns [6] have explored the implementation of DTE in
Linux. Kiszka et al [10] applied DTE to a security model divided into real-time and
non-real-time components and predicted emerging applications and system responses to
expected attacks.

2.2.

Security Visualizations

D2JC was built upon an existing DTEL parser. The base code has been used for other
projects besides the D2JC, such as DTEvisual by Li et al [12]. Expanding on the
pedagogical uses of DTE, DTEvisual accepts a valid DTE specification as input and
outputs a graphical representation of the access control policy. DTEvisual is used for
educational purposes such as modifying policies during classroom lectures.
Because humans are adept at interpreting data visually, security visualizations have a
high potential to improve understanding of security policies and even real-time security
events. Recognizing this, other researchers have also developed security visualization
tools. Hallyn and Kearns [7] have developed a tool called DTEView to aid the
construction of sound DTE policy files through visual representation. Marty [13]
describes techniques for using visualization to extract meaningful information from
network security logs. Other examples of security visualizations include NVisionCC, a
10

tool developed by Yurcik et al [16] for visualizing security events on high performance
clusters, potentially allowing for much better security maintenance of high-node clusters
than traditional command-line tools; and the Intrusion Detection Toolkit by Komlodi et al
[11], a visualization tool for detecting intruders on a network.
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Chapter 3.
3.1.

The DTEL to JSM Compiler

The DTEL Parser

D2JC was built upon an existing DTEL parser. The parser was written using the Java
Compiler Compiler (JavaCC), “a tool that reads a grammar specification and converts it
to a Java program that can recognize matches to the grammar” [8] and converts valid
DTEL specifications into Java data structures for other uses such as the DTEvisual tool
[12].
In implementing D2JC, several minor bug fixes were applied to the existing code base
and semantic error checking was added. If a semantic error is detected, the program
terminates compilation and prints an appropriate error message. Errors detected by the
semantic checker include the following:
•

Multiple types defined with the same name.

•

Multiple domains defined with the same name.

•

Assigning to a nonexistent type.

•

A domain and type sharing the same name.

•

The same path is assigned to multiple types.

•

No generic type is assigned.

•

The initial domain is not a domain.

•

Permissions are applied to something that is not a type (e.g., a domain).

•

Exec or auto is applied to a non-domain entity.

If the scanner reads the DTEL specification successfully and the parser finds no semantic
errors, the program reports that parsing was completed successfully, and compilation is
allowed to continue. If the user specified the “-jsm” command line option when invoking
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the compiler, the compiler proceeds to convert the DTEL Specification into Java Security
Manager code.

3.2.

Restrictions and Limitations

There is not a 1:1 mapping between DTE and JSM. DTE is a general-purpose mandatory
access control specification, whereas JSM intercepts certain kinds of operations invoked
from a Java application and either permits or denies those operations. Because of this,
there are some aspects of DTE which have no JSM equivalent, and vice-versa.
3.2.1.

DTE-to-JSM Non-Equivalencies

UNIX signals. Because a Java application could potentially be running on any operating
system, implementing controls for UNIX signals (e.g., sigkill, sigpause, etc.) would be
unnecessarily restrictive and eliminate cross-platform compatibility.
Domain transitions. The DTEL specification allows for controlling domain transitions
via auto and exec. This involves the creation of a new process. In order to be meaningful,
the new process must be subject to the same security restrictions as the process that
spawned it. The JSM clearly cannot enforce its own restrictions on any non-Java
processes that are spawned. Even if a new Java process is spawned, potential techniques
for transferring the JSM's security restrictions to the new process were deemed
unacceptable, as described under subsection 3.2.3, “Limitations of the Java Security
Manager.”
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3.2.2.

JSM-to-DTE Non-Equivalencies

Sockets. The JSM allows security restrictions on a Java application's socket connections.
Extensive research did not uncover equivalent restrictions configurable through DTE.
Threads. The JSM allows security restrictions on thread access. DTE allows
inter-process restrictions via subject access rights, but no equivalent was found for
threads.
Java-specific components. The JSM allows security restrictions on the Java class loader,
package access, and properties access. As these are Java-specific security concerns, DTE
contains no equivalent.

3.2.3.

Limitations of the Java Security Manager

Even among those security concerns which are shared by DTE and the JSM, not all of
them could be implemented due to limitations in the JSM's design. These limitations are
described below.

Transferring JSM access restrictions. Ordinarily, a Java application must explicitly
install a custom security manager in order to be subject to its security restrictions.
Initially, the D2JC project assumed that a rough simulation of a complete mandatory
access control scheme might be achieved by forcing the initial application to invoke the
DTE-specified JSM and then transferring the JSM's security restrictions to any
subsequent Java applications invoked by the initial application. This approach assumes
that forcing the JSM upon subsequently invoked applications is feasible.

14

Subsequent research revealed this to be unworkable. It is possible to assign a security
manager to a Java application via the command line. The initial approach was to intercept
command-line calls initiated by the initial application. Thus, if the initial application
launched another Java process with a call such as
java ApplicationToInvoke

the security manager would intercept that call and replace it with
java -Djava.security.manager=SecMgr ApplicationToInvoke

thereby transferring its properties to the new application.
However, this approach is thwarted by the fact that JSM's method for checking system
calls, checkExec(String command), receives only the first word of the call. Using the
previous examples, the parameter command would contain the string “java”, nothing
more. This is insufficient information to apply meaningful security restrictions to system
calls.
Due to this limitation, D2JC does not transfer JSM restrictions, nor provide an
implementation for the checkExec method.

Reading and writing files with FileDescriptors. The JSM includes multiple
variations of the checkRead and checkWrite methods, including methods which accept
FileDescriptors

as parameters. This is problematic because the FileDescriptor class

contains no path information, which DTE requires to perform access checks.
Extensive research revealed a possible workaround for this issue. The FileDescriptor
class (obtained by downloading the Java source) contains the fields fd and handle. These
are private fields, but they may be accessed using reflection [9], as follows:
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Field privateField = FileDescriptor.class.getDeclaredField("fd");
privateField.setAccessible(true);
int fd = (int)privateField.get(filedescriptor);

Thus armed with the value of the file descriptor, the JSM could invoke an operating
system tool such as lsof to obtain a list of open files, compare them to the obtained
filedescriptor to find the file in question, get the path information, and finally apply DTE
restrictions.
This solution was partially implemented before it was deemed too operating
system-dependent. The current version of D2JC simply denies all file system accesses
attempted with FileDescriptors.

The Java Security Manager is subject to its own restrictions. For example, if the JSM
attempts to open a file as part of a security check, it calls its own checkRead method to
see if the access is allowed. Combined with certain other Java design decisions, this has
the effect of creating situations where infinite recursive calls of security checks are
unavoidable.
In particular, this behavior interferes with the enforcement of file and directory creation
permissions. All of the standard Java file output operations work by automatically
creating the file being written to (as well as requisite path structure) if it does not already
exist. In order to implement file/directory creation checks, it is necessary to first check if
the file being written to does not yet exist; and if it does not, to check the relevant
permissions.
However, checking for the existence of a file in Java involves creating a new File object
and then checking for its existence; i.e.,
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File file = new File(path);
if(!file.exists()) { /* file creation permission check */ }

This is a problem because the instantiation of the File class causes the security manager
to invoke its own security checks, initiating an endless loop which quickly floods the call
stack and results in the termination of the application.
This behavior might be avoided by invoking native code and performing the file
existence check from there (an option that was explored in some depth), but this would
severely hamper cross-platform compatibility, a limitation deemed unacceptable in the
implementation of this project.
Because of this behavior, the current version of D2JC is unable to enforce these
permissions.

3.3.

The DTE to JSM Converter

Although JSM can make only limited use of the DTE specification, D2JC outputs JSM
code that contains a complete internal representation of all aspects of DTE which are
currently supported by the parser. It also overrides all variations of the checkWrite and
checkRead

methods to implement those file system checks which it is able.

The JSM generated by D2JC employs the use of five internal classes for converting the
DTE permissions to a usable internal representation. The full code of these classes is
given in Listing 3.1.
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Listing 3.1. Internal classes of the D2JC-generated JSM.
class Permission {
public ArrayList<String> types;
public boolean read = false;
public boolean write = false;
public boolean exec = false;
public boolean dir = false;
public boolean create = false;
}
class Transition {
public boolean auto = false;
public boolean exec = false;
public ArrayList<String> domains;
}
class Domain {
public String name;
public ArrayList<String> entryPoints;
public ArrayList<Permission> permissions;
public ArrayList<Transition> transitions;
}
class Type {
public String name;
public ArrayList<TypeAssignment> assignments;
}
class TypeAssignment {
public boolean recursive;
public boolean staticOpt;
public ArrayList<String> paths;
}

When invoked to output JSM code, the compiler uses the information stored by the
DTEL parser to generate a constructor that instantiates objects of the classes given in
listing 3.1, assigns their values, and ultimately places them in ArrayLists of Domains
and Types. It then assigns its own domain as the initial_domain defined in the DTEL
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specification and determines the current working directory of the application that invoked
the JSM.
For executing its file system permission checks, the D2JC-generated JSM implements the
following helper methods:

String convertPath(String path):

Converts Windows paths into Unix paths. Unix

paths are returned unaltered.
String combinePaths(String left, String right):

Extrapolates a single absolute

path from the left path which is used as the “base” (in practice, the current working
directory of the application that invoked the JSM) and the right path which is a relative
path from the base. It is intelligent enough to parse the ../ character sequence to move
up the directory structure of the base path. If the right parameter is an absolute instead
of relative path (i.e. it is preceded by a slash /), the left parameter is ignored and the
right

parameter is returned unaltered.

ArrayList<String> getTypes(String path):

Returns a list of all Types that contain

the path supplied.
boolean checkPermission(String type, int permission):

Checks if, under the

current Domain, the given type permits permission, which is a coded parameter. Values
of 0 through 4 correspond to the permissions create, read, write, execute, and directory,
respectively.
boolean filesystemCheck (String type, int permission):

A generalized method

that contains code common to all file system checks, called on behalf of the JSM's
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and checkWrite methods, which supply the relevant permission to be

checkRead

checked.

Finally, the D2JC-generated JSM overrides the following SecurityManager methods,
which use the helper methods described above:

•

checkDelete(String filename)

•

checkRead(FileDescriptor filedescriptor):

Always throws a

SecurityException (see subsection 3.2.3).
•

checkRead(String filename)

•

checkRead(String filename, Object executionContext): The
executionContext is irrelevant to the DTE check and is ignored.

•

checkWrite(FileDescriptor filedescriptor):

Always throws a

SecurityException (see subsection 3.2.3).
•

checkWrite(String filename)

A more robust implementation was planned and partially implemented, but numerous
features were cut from the final version of the project for reasons described in subsection
3.2.3.
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Chapter 4.
4.1.

Tests and Performance Analysis

Semantic Error Checking

In order to demonstrate the abilities of the semantic error checker, the following
malformed DTEL specification was created:

Listing 4.1. Malformed DTEL specification.
type same_name, same_t, same_t, dup_assign;
domain same_name =

(/sbin/init),
(rd->same_d),
(auto->same_t);

domain same_d =

(/usr/bin/login),
(crwd->same_t),
(exec->same_d);

domain same_d =

(/usr/bin/{sh, csh, tcsh}),
(crwxd->same_name),
(rwd->same_t);

initial_domain = same_t;
assign -r

same_name

/usr/var, /dev, /tmp, /test;

assign -r

same_t

/etc;

assign -r

dup_assign /dev;

assign -r

non_existent /fakepath;

assign -r -s same_t

/dte;

The DTEL specification given in Listing 4.1 contains the following semantic errors:
•

The initial domain is assigned to a type.

•

There is no generic type.
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•

The name same_name is defined for a type and a domain.

•

There are two domains called same_d.

•

There are two types called same_t.

•

A domain tries to assign auto to a type.

•

Access permissions are applied to a domain.

•

Attempts to assign to a nonexistent type (non_existent).

•

Attempts to assign the path /dev to multiple types.

When attempting to compile the DTEL file, the compiler reports each of these errors:
Type 'same_t' has multiple definitions.
Domain 'same_d' has multiple definitions.
Type and domain lists both contain identifier 'same_name'
There is no generic type defined.
initial_domain set to 'same_t' which is not defined as a domain
Permissions tried to reference undefined type 'same_d'
Attempted exec or auto transition to 'same_t' which is not defined
as a domain
Invalid identifier 'non_existent' with assign statement.
Path '/dev' assigned to multiple types

Note that each of these errors corresponds to one of the semantic checks described in
Section 3.1, so this comprises a thorough test of the semantic checker's ability to detect
all of the errors defined for this version of D2JC. Fixing each of these errors yields the
DTEL specification given in Listing 4.2.

Listing 4.2. Corrected DTEL specification.
type same_name, same_t, diff_t;
domain diff_name =

(/sbin/init),
(rd->same_t),
(auto->same_d);
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domain same_d =

(/usr/bin/login),
(crwd->same_t),
(exec->same_d);

domain diff_d =

(/usr/bin/{sh, csh, tcsh}),
(crwxd->same_name),
(rwd->diff_t);

initial_domain = same_d;
assign -r

same_name

/usr/var, /dev, /tmp, /test;

assign -r

same_t

/;

assign -r -s diff_t

/dte;

When the compiler is run on the corrected DTEL specification, it reports no errors and
compilation is completed successfully, outputting Java code for a custom security
manager.

4.2.

File System Permissions

In order to function correctly, the JSM class outputted by D2JC must have the following
behaviors:
1. It should be subject to the permission restrictions defined by the DTEL
specification for the initial domain.
2. Because the current version of D2JC does not support transitioning to other
domains, it should not be subject to permission restrictions for other domains
besides the initial domain.
3. It should be able to write to files in those directories defined as writable for the
types assigned to the initial domain.
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4. It should be able to read from files in those directories defined as writable for the
types assigned to the initial domain.
5. It should not be able to read/write from files for which it has not been given
permission to do so via type assignment to the initial domain.
6. It should parse both Windows and Unix paths correctly.
7. It should understand that the ../ character sequence in directory paths means to
move up in the directory structure.

In order to test the correct functioning of D2JC's file system permissions, the following
DTEL specification was created:

Listing 4.3. DTEL specification for testing file system permissions.
type generic_t, writable_t, readable_t, both_t, neither_t,
other_t;
domain start_d =

(/sbin/init),
(r->readable_t),
(w->writable_t),
(rw->both_t);

domain unreachable_d = (/fakepath),
(rw->other_t);
initial_domain = start_d;
assign -r

generic_t

/;

assign -r

writable_t

/test/writable;

assign -r

readable_t

/test/readable;

assign -r

neither_t

/test/neither;

assign -r

other_t

/test/otherd;
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assign -r

both_t

/test/both, /test/both2;

The DTEL specification in Listing 4.3 defines six types, including a generic type to
satisfy DTE requirements. The specification also defines two domains, start_d and
unreachable_d. start_d

is defined as the initial domain. This domain is given read

permission to readable_t, write permission to writable_t, read and write permission
to both_t, and no permissions to the other types. unreachable_d is given read and write
permissions to other_t.
To test the JSM class generated when this DTEL file is compiled with D2JC, the
following application was created:

Listing 4.4. Security test application to verify the custom JSM's behavior.
import java.io.*;
class SecurityTest {
public static void main(String[] args) {
// Assign security manager
try {
System.setSecurityManager(new DTESecurityManager());
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
}
System.out.println("Successfully set security manager.");
// Write to /test/writable
try {
FileWriter fstream = new
FileWriter("M:\\test\\writable\\WriteOut.txt");
BufferedWriter out = new BufferedWriter(fstream);
out.write("Writing to file.");
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out.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
}
// Read from /test/writable
try {
FileReader fstream = new
FileReader("/test/writable/ReadIn.txt");
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(fstream);
System.out.println(in.readLine());
in.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
}
// Write to /test/writable/deeper
try {
FileWriter fstream = new
FileWriter("/test/writable/deeper/../deeper/WriteOut.txt");
BufferedWriter out = new BufferedWriter(fstream);
out.write("Writing to file.");
out.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
}
// Read from /test/writable/deeper
try {
FileReader fstream = new
FileReader("/test/writable/deeper/ReadIn.txt");
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(fstream);
System.out.println(in.readLine());
in.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
}
// Similar tests for remaining types
// (omitted from code listing)
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System.out.println("Testing complete.");
}
}

The application in Listing 4.4 tries to read from and write to /test/writable, and then,
to ensure that permissions are being applied recursively (so that paths do not have to be
an exact match, but may be prefixes), it tries to read from and write to
/test/writable/deeper.
/test/neither.
/test/both2,

It performs the same tests with /test/readable and

It then performs the same tests with /test/otherd, /test/both, and

except that the deeper checks are omitted for brevity, recursive

directories having already been checked by the preceding tests. If any of these operations
throws an exception, it catches the exception and prints it to stdout. The relevant
directories and the ReadIn.txt files were created ahead of time for the purposes of the
test. The text files contained a single line of text, “I am the first line from the ReadIn file
in [path to file].”
This application comprises a thorough test of the required behaviors defined previously.
Attempting to read from and write to the various directories defined by the DTEL
specification, including directories with only read, only write, and both read and write
permissions, verifies requirements (1), (3), (4), and (5). Attempting to read from and
write to /test/otherd, which the domain unreachable_d has permissions to, verifies
requirement (2), that other domains' permissions are not being applied to the current
domain. The application also includes a Windows-style path, verifying condition (6), and
a path that uses the ../ character sequence, verifying condition (7).
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Running this test yielded the following output:

Successfully set security manager.
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to
/test/writable/ReadIn.txt
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to
/test/writable/deeper/ReadIn.txt
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to
/test/readable/WriteOut.txt
I am the first line from the ReadIn file in /test/readable.
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to
/test/readable/deeper/WriteOut.txt
I am the first line from the ReadIn file in /test/readable/deeper.
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to
/test/neither/WriteOut.txt
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to
/test/neither/ReadIn.txt
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to
/test/neither/deeper/WriteOut.txt
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to
/test/neither/deeper/ReadIn.txt
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to
/test/otherd/WriteOut.txt
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to
/test/otherd/ReadIn.txt
I am the first line from the ReadIn file in /test/both.
I am the first line from the ReadIn file in /test/both2.
Testing complete.

Lastly, an examination of the directories revealed that the WriteOut.txt files had been
created in /test/writable, /test/writable/deeper, /test/both, and
/test/both2,

and contained the correct text contents, but these files had not been

created in the other directories. This is the expected behavior, thus verifying the correct
operation of the permission checks.
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4.3.

Performance Analysis

4.3.1.

Compilation Time

In the process of performing semantic error checking, the compiler makes numerous
comparisons. A small number of these comparisons occur during the scanning phase and
are dependent on the time complexity of the scanner, which was written prior to this
project. The remainder of the checks and their time complexities are analyzed below:

A generic type and initial domain are validly specified. These checks both use data
gathered during scanning that allows them to be performed in constant time.
Duplicate names in types and domains. To ensure that no type possesses the same
name as any domain, the parser compares each domain with each type, resulting in O(dt)
complexity where d and t are the numbers of domains and types, respectively.
Duplicate type assignments. To ensure that the same path is not assigned to any two
types, the parser compares every path in every type with every path in every other type,
resulting in O(p2) complexity where p is the total number of paths from all types.
Permissions are only applied to types. To ensure that permissions are not applied to a
non-type entity, for every set of permissions, the parser checks that permission's target
with all types, resulting in O(pt) complexity where p and t are the number of permissions
and types, respectively.
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Transitions are only applied to domains. To ensure that auto or exec transitions are not
applied to a non-domain entity, for every set of transitions, the parser checks that
transition's target with all domains, resulting in O(rd) complexity where r and d are the
number of transitions and domains, respectively.

All of these checks require either constant or polynomial time, so the semantic error
checks added by the D2JC parser add polynomial time complexity to the compilation
time of DTEL specifications.

4.3.2.

Real-time Permission Checks

Every file system check in D2JC is performed in essentially the same manner. First, the
security manager iterates through all of its paths, noting those which match the path of
the file being checked and recording their corresponding types. This operation is linear in
the number of paths contained in the DTE specification. Then the security manager
iterates through all of the types returned in the preceding operation, and for each one, it
iterates through all of the permissions defined for the current domain, all of the types
assigned to those permissions, and allows the access if the requested operation is allowed
for any of the types whose paths correspond to the file being checked. If the security
manager completes this entire process without finding any matches, then it denies the
access attempt.
The total running time of one check is therefore O(t1pt2) + O(h), where t1 is the number of
types to check against, p is the number of permissions in the current domain, t2 is the
number of types in each permission, and h is the number of paths in the DTE
specification. Although this is a polynomial-time operation, the values of t1, p, and t2 are
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likely to be small even in relatively complex DTE specifications, so these checks can be
completed quickly in the vast majority of cases.
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Chapter 5.
5.1.

Conclusion

Future Work

The current version of D2JC is limited in the DTEL restrictions it can implement. It could
gain even more value as a pedagogical tool if its capabilities were expanded. One
approach would be to implement some of the workarounds described in subsection 3.2.3,
which were deemed infeasible for this version of the compiler. Different versions of the
compiler could be implemented for different operating systems in an effort to preserve
cross-platform compatibility.
Alternatively, future iterations of the project could explore alternatives to the Java
Security Manager. For example, JSM shares security responsibilities with the access
controller and class loader [14]. If D2JC were modified to output not only JSM code, but
to utilize additional Java security features, it may be able to achieve a more robust
implementation of DTEL specifications.
Another alternative would be to implement a special Java application that acts as a virtual
machine specifically for implementing DTE security policies. This virtual machine could
implement its own, more powerful version of the security manager, and D2JC could be
modified to output code for this customized JSM. This approach would allow for
unlimited implementation of DTEL specifications, but implementing the virtual machine
might involve a significant amount of work.
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5.2.

Potential Applications

D2JC's limitations render it inappropriate for industrial use, but it contains many features
valuable for pedagogical purposes. It is useful for teaching students how to create
well-formed DTEL specifications due to its syntactic and semantic error checking. It also
teaches students the basics of incorporating the Java Security Manager into their
applications, since the code outputted by D2JC needs to be compiled and installed
manually in the application that will make use of it. It also provides an implementation of
most of DTE's file permission security checks. However, it must be noted that there are
many parts of the DTEL specification that cannot be implemented in the outputted JSM
code, so while D2JC has substantial use as a supplement, it is not a complete tool for
teaching students how DTE works.
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